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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Promoting balanced regional development has been a long-t rm public policy 
objective ever since the establishment of the Congest d Districts Boards t the turn 
of the century.  However, although Regional Development Organisations were set 
up in 1969, there has not been a clearly articulated strategy for regional policy.  The 
only clear semblance of a regional policy which can be identified is the ex stence of 
measures such as regionally differentiated industrial grants, devised in an attempt to 
influence the spatial dispersion of mobile investment, and the Compensatory 
Allowance Scheme (“headage” payments) in the case of agriculture which is targeted 
towards the so-called disadvantaged areas.   
 
The use of regionally differentiated grants followed on the enactment of the 
Underdeveloped Areas Act of 1952.  These grants have been one of the main planks 
of regional policy.  The radical Buchanan (1968) strategy of the late 1960s, with its 
proposal to select a small group of “growth centres”, was briefly considered but was 
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not adopted in any serious way. Instead, regional industrial grants were 
supplemented by other measures such as the building of industrial estates in 
anticipation of attracting inward investment (Walsh, 1989).  During the 1980s the 
emphasis of the grants shifted towards job creation while the location of new firms 
became less important.  More recently these regionally differentiated grants have 
been augmented by EU regional policy instruments such as the Structural Funds. 
 
The EU has been pursuing a policy of promoting regional convergence over many 
years but the vigour with which it has been pursued was stepped up in the 1990s.  
The instruments used by the EU have been incorporated into the Community Support 
Frameworks(CSF) for Ireland and in other “Objective 1” regions in Europe.  The 
impacts of these instruments provide important insights into the optimal regional 
policy for Ireland. 
 
The explicit strategy underlying the CSF is that the transfer of resources to the 
poorer Member States should make a permanent contribution to the process of 
convergence between regions.  This has involved a policy of trying to confine the use 
of EU transfers to funding investment rather than using them to directly support 
living standards.  If successful, this policy should result in a process of permanent 
convergence in living standards, measured as output per head, across the EU that 
will extend beyond the life of the transfers. In other words, the focus on the 
enhancement of productivity will lead, all other things being equal, to an 
enhancement of living standards.  The evidence for Ireland is that the strategy has 
been successful as far as the country as a whole is concerned.  If the EU funding 
were to be terminated now it has been estimated that Irish GNP would remain at least 
two percentage points higher than it would have been without the transfers 
(Honohan, 1997). 
 
The options for regional policy within a nation state, and especially a small state like 
Ireland, are in many respects more complex than those which are presented at EU 
level.  One point of difference is that at EU level there is no commitment to a 
permanent flow of transfers to poorer regions.  By contrast, within a country, the 
nature of the state makes it possible for such transfers to continue indefinitely.  Thus 
it is perfectly feasible for Irish governments to determine that balanced regional 
development within the country should be achiev d by the delivery of transfers 
through the welfare and taxation systems with the aim of progressing the 
equalisiation of regional disposable per capita income.  Such a strategy would be 
quite consistent with a policy objective of maximising national productivity since the 
latter would maximise the resources available for re-distribution within the state 
according to any number of appropriate criteria, including the regional dimension.  
The question is whether there is any role for a regional investme t strat gy within the 
state akin to the CSF at EU level in the promotion of balanced regional development.  
And if so what form should it take? 
 
One option that is championed in many quarters is for the state to encourage a more 
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even dispersal of the factors of production, and especially public goods, across the 
sub-national regions.  This implies the restriction of economic development in 
certain regions and its promotion in others.  The crucial policy issue that arises is 
whether such a strategy is consistent with maximising national productivity and 
ultimately welfare? We will argue that the concentration of economic activity in 
some regions is a reflection of fundamental agglomeration economies that the state 
should not be quick to ignore or to deliberately downplay.  We will also argue that 
given certain geographical fundamentals pertaining to the urban hierarchy within 
Ireland there may be limited scope for the creation of new poles of attraction for the 
location of economic activity of sufficient crtical mass.  At the same time it has to 
be recognised that the concentration of economic activity creates negative 
externalities mainly relating to congestion.  These congestion effects are not due to 
the location of economic activity per se but they relate in large part to the population 
settlement patters that result.  Poor infrastructure in terms of roads and social capital 
and inadequate public transport systems create negative congestion effects which can 
offset the positive agglomeration effects associated with the concentration of the 
factors of production, especially labour.  At the same time it is legitimate for the 
state to be concerned about the decline in population and the decay of communities 
in areas beyond the commuting compass of these areas of concentration.  
 
The policy perspective we will argue for in this paper has three broad aspects.  First, 
we will argue that policies of redistribution that have an explicit regional emphasis 
are unlikely to be justified in Ireland's unitary State.  Second, we will stress the 
importance of agglomeration economies in sustaining regional productivity 
imbalances at least in the 1990s.  Third, we will argue that there is a key role for 
State investment strategies and user-cost pricing schemes which concentrate on 
expanding the commuting compass of those existing centres of concentration that 
have sufficient critical mass to generate and re-g nerate agglomeration economies.   
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 examines a variety of data sources and 
welfare measures that can be used to determine the degree of regional convergence.  
We look at both output data and income data at the level of the eight Regional Areas.  
In Section 3 we introduce two measures of convergence that provide useful and 
different insights into the convergence process at regional level.  We then apply 
these measures to the data on regional welfare.  Section 4 takes a first step in 
understanding the sources of regional disparities in economic welfare.  We 
decompose the inter-regional variation in economic welfare into a number of 
components relating to participation, employment, dependency and productivity 
rates.  We also decompose the regional variation in productivity into “within” and 
“between” sector effects.  In Section 5 we consider a largely theoretical explanation 
of the inter-regional productivity differentials by focusing on the role of urbanisation 
and particularly agglomeration economies.  We also provide some indicative tests of 
the agglomeration hypothesis.  We explore aspects of the geography of the urban 
hierarchy and population settlement patterns in Section 6 which emphasises the 
constraints of history under which regional policy must operate in Ireland.  In 
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Section 7, we consider the basis for regional policy in a country such as Ireland.  We 
outline the arguments in respect of (i) a policy of re-distribution that contains explicit 
regional targeting and (ii) a policy related to the exploitation of economies from 
agglomeration.  Finally, in Section 8 we present some conclusions. 
 
2. REGIONAL MEASURES OF ECONOMIC WELFARE  
 
The interest in conducting regional comparisons of income or output is presumably 
to determine the relative level of economic welfare across regions and over time.  
Most economists would accept that the most useful measure of economic welfare for 
this purpose is real GDP per capita.  There has been a proliferation of studies to 
assess the extent of cross- ountry convergence in economic welfare measured in this 
sense (see for example Barro (1991), Sala-i-Martin, (1994), Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992)).  Among the many problems confronted in these studies has been the 
departure of nominal exchange rates from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) which has 
lead virtually all analysts in this field to use what are termed “international prices”, 
that is PPPs suitably adjusted instead of a common currency standard (see, for 
example, Summers and Heston, 1991).  
 
Ideally, in the context of regional comparisons of economic welfare within countries, 
which is the focus of our study, one should employ region-sp cific price deflators.  
The motivation for the compilation of such deflators includes the under-pricing of 
public utilities in regions of low population density and divergences in transport 
costs.  But the ubiquitous example of the haircut price in New York and Karachi also 
readily transposes to Letterkenny and Tralee.  Moreover, there is no reason to 
suppose that these regional deflators would display a similar inter-te poral trend.  
However, as we lack the necessary information to compile such regional-specific 
indices we proxy regional welfare using nominal measures.  
 
In the Irish context it is well known that the difficulties associated with profit 
repatriations by multinationals render GDP a misleading index of economic welfare.  
Profit repatriations indicate that a significant quantity of capital used to produce 
output is owned by non-Irish residents.  This has meant that GDP exceeds GNP by a 
factor which has averaged about 15 percent in recent years. 
 
In this paper the regional unit generally referred to is the Regional Authority Area.  
There are eight regions comprised of the following counties:  
 
· Border:  Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan and Sligo; 
· Dublin:  Dublin Corporation Borough, Dun-Laoghaire and Rathdown, 
 Fingal and South Dublin; 
· Mid-East:  Kildare, Meath and Wicklow; 
· Midlands: Laois, Longford, Offaly and Westmeath; 
· Mid-West: Clare, Limerick Corporation Borough, Limerick and Tipperary 
  159
 North; 
· South-East:  Carlow, Kilkenny, Tipperary South, Waterford Corporation 
 Borough, Waterford and Wexford; 
· South-West:  Cork Corporation Borough, Cork and Kerry; 
· West:  Galway Corporation Borough, Galway, Mayo and Roscommon. 
 
We now consider two general measures of welfare that are employed throughout this 
paper.   
 
Gross Value Added 
 
Two data sources may be used to assess the extent of convergence of regional 
incomes.  The first is the Central Statistics Office (CSO) publication on Regional 
Accounts (1998) which is the series that determines the eligibility for “O jective 1” 
status in the context of the allocation of EU Structural Funds.  The Regional 
Accounts provide estimates of each region’s Gross Value Added (GVA), or 
approximately GDP, and estimates are available form 1991 to 1996.  The CSO 
produce two main concepts of GVA: 
 
GVA at basic prices is a measure of the value of goods and services produced in a 
region priced at the value which the producers receive minus any taxes payable and 
plus any subsidies received as a consequence of their production or sale. 
 
and 
 
GVA at factor cost is a measure of the value of goods and services produced in a 
region priced at the value which the producers receive minus any taxes payable and 
plus all subsidies. 
 
GVA at factor cost would seem to be the most economically relevant income concept 
if the objective is to assess the level and growth of economic welfare in a region. As 
the CSO (1998) note this is the concept which is used by Eurostat in determining 
“Objective 1” eligibility.  GVA at basic prices excludes what are termed “overhead” 
subsidies or “subsidies not related to sales”.  In the case of the agricultural sector this 
involves excluding all payments under the “headage” and comparable payments 
funded out of FEOGA- uarantee (e.g., livestock premia and cereal “set aside” 
compensation).  Given the growth in such direct payments to the agricultural sector 
in recent years - in 1997 they amounted to almost £1 billion, or nearly 50% of 
national farm income - GVA at basic prices will thus give a misleading indication of 
the welfare of the agricultural sector and hence of regions where the agricultural 
sector is dominant. 
 
When viewed from the perspective of the relevant prices which producers face, the 
exclusion of “subsidies not related to sales” would not be inappropriate if these 
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subsidies were considered to be “decoupled” from product supply and input demand 
decisions.  In other words, the point at issue is whether it is reasonable to consider 
such subsidies as lump sum transfers to producers.  Given the conditions attaching to 
receipt of these payments, the most reasonable assessment is that ex ante they ought 
to be considered “partially decoupled” transfers (see Boyle, 1995).   
 
The exclusion of taxes may also distort the relative input prices facing agricultural 
producers.  Since non-agricultural producers are registered for VAT the relevant 
input prices are the VAT exclusive prices.  The situation with agriculture is a little 
more complex.  Most producers are not registered for VAT but are compensated for 
VAT paid on inputs through a flat-rate rebate mechanism that effectively involves 
the payment of a production subsidy. 
 
As noted above, there are more general problems that afflict the GVA measure 
which render it a very deficient index of economic welfare.  Regional GVA, or GDP, 
measures the value of goods and services produced within a region regardless of 
where the ownership of the factors of production generating the output resides.  The 
phenomenon of profit repatriations by multinationals which renders GDP deficient as 
a welfare measure at the national level becomes even more magnified at the regional 
level, where the dependency of a region’s output on multinational investment will be 
much more apparent than at the national level.  But added to this difficulty will be 
the fact that at regional level - unlike at the national level - a significant fraction of 
the labour input which produces the output in a given region may reside outside that 
region.  The most obvious examples are the Dublin and Midlands-East region  where 
there is substantial inter-regional commuting by labour.   
 
Household Income 
 
The Household Budget Surveys (HBSs), which have been conducted by the CSO 
from the early 1960s, provide another source for determining the extent of income 
convergence.  By construction this source cannot capture all economic activity but it 
will capture a significant component.  Moreover, as far this component is concerned 
income estimates from the HBS do not suffer from the mismatch between region of 
output generation and region of residence of the labour resource which afflicts the 
GVA measure.  A number of income concepts can be determined from the HBSs 
(CSO, 1997).  In this study we use three concepts:
 
Direct Household Income (DIHI) includes all gross money receipts (that is, before 
deduction of income tax and social insurance contributions) which accrue to the 
household together with the value of any free goods and services regularly received 
by household members and the retail value of own farm or garden produce 
consumed by the household.  The measure includes wages and salaries of 
employees; self employment income; retirement pensions and investment and 
property income. 
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Gross Household Income (GHI) is defined as DIHI plus State transfer payments. 
 
Disposable Household Income (DPHI) is defined as GHI less direct taxation 
(including social insurance contributions).   
 
It will be noted that DIHI includes factor payments from abroad and GHI 
incorporates transfers in the form of social welfare payments so in these respects 
they provide a more comprehensive estimate of personal incomes than that implied 
by the GVA measures.   
 
3. REGIONAL CONVERGENCE IN ECONOMIC WELFARE  
 
Theory and Measurement 
The concern of this paper is not with the level of regional economic welfare in the 
determination of eligibility for “Objective 1” Structural Fund status.  Rather our 
focus is with the phenomenon of regional convergence.  Specifically we want to first 
of all establish the extent of regional convergence in measures of economic welfare 
and second to explore the possible factors that might underlie the observed 
convergence trends. 
 
The literature on convergence in both its theoretical and empirical aspects is 
voluminous.  The neoclassical model of economic growth predicts that to the extent 
that a country or region is off its steady state growth path at some initial point in time 
it will converge to that steady state over time (see Romer (1996) for a lucid 
exposition).  Convergence in this sense is now usually referred to as conditional 
convergence in that it implies that a country’s or region’s economic welfare will 
converge to that in other countries or regions conditional on the determinants (e.g., 
physical capital and human capital stocks) of its unique steady state welfare level.  
The implication of this concept of convergence is that gaps in welfare across regions 
may be preserved over the long run due to different steady states across regions.  
Thus there is no reason to expect absolute convergence of economic welfare across 
regions in the sense that all regions will ever attain the same level of welfare.  The 
important question then is to understand the reasons for inter-regional income 
differences so as to shed light on the possible role for policy to address these 
differences. 
 
The measurement of convergence has proved to be controversial.  Arising from the 
neoclassical model of economic growth it was natural to establish the degree of 
convergence by regressing the growth in economic welfare (typically GDP per 
capita) over a given period n the initial level of GDP per capita nd on the 
determinants of steady state welfare.  This has certainly been the approach since the 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) paper, although earlier work excluded the latter 
variables.  This regression approach has been termed Barro regressions and/or tests 
of b-convergence.  A statistically significant b  (the coefficient on the initial level of 
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GDP per capita) it is argued would allow one to conclude that poor countries or 
regions grow faster than rich regions. 
 
Barro regressions have been subject to severe criticism on the grounds that they fall 
foul of Galton’s regression fallacy3 (see Friedman,1992 and Quah, 1993) and hence 
the method is biased towards finding a negative b.  Friedman (1992) first proposed a 
simple alternative that is not subject to Galton’s fallacy.  His proposal involves the 
computation of the coefficient of variation (COV) of cross-regional welfare 
measures for each time period.  Convergence would be implied by a falling COV 
over time.  This form of convergence has been labeled s-convergence by Sala-i-
Martin (1994).  It will be noted that Friedman’s approach does not easily take 
account of the need to control for the determinants of ‘steady state’ welfare as 
required by theory although in principle it is clear that this can be done. 
 
Sala-i-Martin (1994), in an attempt to rehabilitate the flawed Barro-regression 
procedure, shows that while s-convergence implies b-convergence, the absence of 
s-convergence does not imply the absence of b-convergence.  He constructs the 
ingenious example of a football league where the number of teams is constant over a 
given time period.  By construction in this example s-convergence is constant yet it 
is clearly possible for b-convergence to be observed over time as the position of 
teams in the league changes through time.  In other words b-convergence captures 
the extent of intra distributional mobility.  He then goes on to imply that the only 
way of capturing this phenomenon is to perform Barro-regressions despite th  
fundamental Friedman-Quah (FQ) critique. 
 
Quah (1993), however, has proposed an alternative methodology which captures the 
degree of intra-distributional mobility but which does not suffer from the FQ 
critique.  It involves the use of Markov chains to analyse the intertemporal transition 
of income distributions.  His approach is however labourious to implement and 
simpler approaches will convey much of the important information given by the 
Quah methodology. 
 
Boyle and McCarthy (1997, 1999) propose that an index of rank concordance, to be 
labeled as g-convergence, be used in conjunction with the index of s-convergence in 
testing for b-convergence.  The advantages of this index, apart from its simplicity, 
are twofold.  First, it allows one to determine whether b-convergence exists in a 
situation where s-convergence is constant.  Second, while g-conv rgence clearly 
doesn’t capture all the potentially rich features of changing income distributions, 
which Quah’s methodology allows2, it nonetheless provides an important additional 
summary indicator to s-convergence in assessing the nature of the evolving 
distribution. 
 
The two indices which we use to determine the degree of regional convergence in 
measures of economic welfare are thus: 
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where   Var(Y) refers to the variance of the particular measure of economic 
welfare for the cross-section of regions; and Var(RY) is the corresponding 
variance of the ranks; ti refers to year i and t0 is the base year. 
 
Application to the Irish Regions 
Table 1 furnishes data on GVA at basic prices from 1991 to 1996.3 In broad terms a 
threefold classification of regions exists.  Taking the GVA per capita for all regions 
in 1995 as 100, the index ranges from 121 for the East (Dublin + Mid East) to 97 in 
the group containing the Southwest, Southeast and Mid-West and 74 in the 
combined West, Midlands and Border regions.
 
Table 1: Regional GVA Per Capita (£) at Basic Prices 1991 to 1996 
Region 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Border 5982 6444 6752 7236 7743 8431 
Dublin 9491 10161 10898 12122 13342 14592 
Mid-East 4995 5356 5610 6764 8905 9096 
Midland 5256 5574 6067 6266 6681 7331 
Mid-West 6697 7304 7661 8552 9261 9825 
South-East 6515 7082 7781 8277 8848 9786 
South-West 7478 8289 9282 9635 10900 11680 
West 5489 5845 6135 6375 7291 8057 
       
s-convergence 21.14 21.49 22.47 22.79 22.04 22.12 
g-convergence  1.00 1.00 0.99 0.75 0.40 0.58 
       
IRELAND 7169 7742 8322 9058 10106 10952 
Source: CSO (1998) and Department of Finance (1998). 
 
Over the six years it is apparent that there is absolutely no evidence of s-
convergence.  The substantial inter-regional gaps in GVA per capita have persisted 
over time.  There is some evidence of g-convergence in 1994 and 1995 but this is 
mainly due to an altering in the ranking of those regions which were initially the 
most lowly ranked. 
 
GVA per capita data at factor cost are available from 1994 and are presented in 
Table 2.  This measure incorporates certain overhead subsidies that as noted earlier
are especially important in the agricultural sector and hence would be expected to 
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affect the regions that have a heavy concentration in agriculture.  The main message 
here again is the absence of convergence in either its s or g manifestations.  It is 
evident, however, that the inclusion of the agricultural subsidies in particular render 
the magnitude of the coefficient of variation lower and hence indicate a slightly more 
equal distribution of welfare across the regions. 
 
Table 2: Regional GVA Per Capita (£) At Factor Cost 1994-1996 
Region 1994 1995 1996 
Border  7473 8017 8963 
Dublin 11649 12939 14572 
Mid-East 6863 9082 9302 
Midland 6509 7002 7698 
Mid-West 8694 9375 10084 
South-East 8511 9122 10090 
South-West 9752 11047 11820 
West  6722 7636 8458 
    
s-convergencea  20.03 19.46 20.17 
g-convergence  1.00 0.95 0.94 
    
IRELAND 9060 10151 11162 
Source: CSO (1998) and Department of Finance (1998). 
 
Regional estimates of GVA per capita are output measures and should not be 
regarded as ideal measures of living standards.  Given the data limitations and also 
that the regional pattern of GVA is largely influenced by the location decisions of 
major private investors, who may contend that there are very few alternative 
locations that will meet their requirements, it is necessary to consider some 
alternative indicators of incomes as a measure of the standard of living which people 
experience in each of the regions.  The CSO Household Budget Surveys provide data 
on household incomes segregated by source for each region for 1973,1980, 1987 and 
1994.  From this data one can establish the extent of differences between regions and 
trends over time.  Table 3 furnishes the relevant data. 
 
Table 3: Regional Household Income Per Capita Per Week (£) 1973-1994 
Direct Income 
Region* 1973 1980 1987 1994 
Donegal and North-West 5.34 18.65 41.16 65.10 
North-East 8.65 24.64 47.08 74.45 
East 10.58 36.49 68.40 108.81 
Midland 7.04 27.12 46.92 75.88 
Mid-West 8.27 26.45 60.02 74.76 
South-East 9.49 25.60 51.45 71.48 
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South-West 9.25 30.12 55.93 76.60 
West 6.93 23.68 51.09 78.04 
s-convergence  20.48 19.44 13.84 16.67 
g-convergence  1.00 0.86 0.73 0.90 
Gross Income 
Region* 1973 1980 1987 1994 
Donegal and North-West  6.90 24.40 57.59 86.25 
North-East 7.72 28.77 61.94 92.77 
East 11.40 39.51 80.30 125.22 
Midland 8.12 30.78 58.96 92.90 
Mid-West 9.48 30.63 71.93 92.66 
South-East 10.52 30.08 64.47 90.35 
South-West 10.29 33.90 67.59 94.37 
West 8.35 28.59 63.50 94.70 
s-convergence  17.19 14.30 11.31 12.53 
g-convergence  1.00 0.68 0.94 0.65 
Disposable Income 
Region* 1973 1980 1987 1994 
Donegal and North-West 6.45 21.88 50.02 74.62 
North-East 8.87 25.28 51.97 77.53 
East 9.86 32.24 62.51 98.93 
Midland 7.66 27.06 49.47 79.86 
Mid-West 8.71 26.72 58.85 78.85 
South-East 9.70 26.48 53.82 75.92 
South-West 9.37 29.16 55.61 79.46 
West 7.65 25.18 54.39 80.42 
s-convergence  13.90 11.35 8.09 9.46 
g-convergence  1.00 0.86 0.40 0.73 
* Data up to 1994 are available on the old ‘Planning Region’ basis whereas data for 1994 are 
available on a ‘Regional Authority’ basis.  We have adapted the 1994 data to roughly 
conform to the older regional categories. 
Source: CSO Household Budget Surveys (various years). 
 
Three measures of income are reported for the regions: Direct Income, Gross Income 
and Disposable Income.  The Direct Income concept is closest to the GVA measures 
and reflects underlying productivity relationships.  The change in the ranking by 
income compared to output across regions in 1994 is striking.  Using incomedata, 
the Southeast region ranks second lowest after Donegal and the North-West, while 
the West and Midlands are close to the economy-wide average.  Furthermore, the 
range of the distribution of income is more compressed than that for output.  Clearly 
a very significant amount of income redistribution is being achieved through the tax 
and welfare system. 
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There are a number of specific features of this table worth noting.  First, for nearly 
all income measures there is strong evidence of both s  and g-convergence up to the 
late 1980s, the exception is g-convergence for Gross Income.  This point was also 
noted by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC, 1997).  However, 
between the 1987 and 1994 surveys there is strong evidence of a reversal of this 
trend.  These results would thus appear to confirm the impression generated by the 
GVA measures.  A second feature is that the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of 
variation is substantially less than the GVA measures indicating a narrower variation 
in incomes.  Thirdly, we note that State transfers and the impact of direct taxation 
serve to substantially narrow the per capita income gap between the regions, as is 
evidenced by the significantly lower coefficients of variation for Gross Income and 
Disposable Income.   
 
The average weekly household disposable income in 1994 in the East had an index 
of 115 (Ireland = 100) followed by the Midlands, West and Southwest (all between 
94 and 97) with the lowest in the Midwest (91), Border (90) and Southeast (88).  The 
average household income in Dublin exceeded that in the Southeast by 29 percent.  
The range across regions for household income indices is only half that for the per 
capita GVA indices. Furthermore there is no correlation between the two 
distributions.  While the East has the highest indices on both distributions, the 
second highest average household incomes are in the West and Midlands regions 
which have the lowest p r capita GVA indices. 
 
The regional pattern of change has been very uneven.  Between 1987 and 1994 by 
far the largest increase in disposable incomes was recorded for the Midlands which 
had the second lowest level in 1987.  Broadly similar increases occurred in the West, 
Border and East regions.  By contrast, households in the Mid-West, Southwest and 
Southeast on average recorded only marginal increases.  Excluding the East, these 
data suggest some convergence has taken place among households in the remaining 
regions.   
 
A very significant amount of income redistribution has been achieved through the 
taxation system and welfare programmes as well as other State and EU-fund d 
income supports.  The contribution of these mechanisms has been greatest in the 
weaker regions.  State transfers accounted for approximately one quarter of the 
average household disposable income in the Border region in 1994 compared to one-
sixth in Dublin, despite the very high concentrations of low income households in the 
city.  It is evident that the tax and transfer system has had a very significant impact 
on reducing inter regional differences in household incomes.  For example, in 1994 
the average tax rate for Dublin households was 25 percent compared to 18.3 percent 
in the West, which has the second highest average direct household income (see 
O'Leary (1998)). 
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The published HBS data also permit us to examine the degree of convergence of 
incomes between urban and rural areas where the latter are divided into farm and 
non-farm categories.  With only three spatial categories it does not make sense to 
compute measures of g-convergence so we only present s-co vergence indices in 
Tables 4 and 5 for 1987 and 1994.  It is apparent that as far as the rural/urban 
demarcation is concerned there is no evidence of significant convergence for any of 
the income measures. An exception is Dispo able Income where the evidence 
suggests a trend towards divergence. 
 
Table 4: Rural and Urban Household Income Per Capita Per Week (£)  
1987 and 1994 
 Direct Income Gross Income Disposable Income 
 1987 1994 1987 1994 1987 1994 
Urban 64.24 95.64 76.40 113.54 59.96 91.19 
Rural Farm 51.37 86.95 62.33 98.44 57.60 88.17 
Rural Non-Farm 47.10 68.41 61.04 87.47 50.90 73.78 
       
s-convergence 16.46 16.63 12.80 13.11 8.37 11.03 
Source: CSO Household Budget Surveys (various years). 
We have also conducted an analysis of the distribution of incomes within these 
spatial categories using data available from the CSO's anonymised data files.  We 
provide summary information in the form of coefficient of variation estimates in 
Table 5 for three different income concepts in respect or the rural/urban 
classification. 
 
These data suggest three observations.  First, rural non-farm households have the 
widest dispersion of Direct Incomes.  Second, the dispersion converges across the 
three spatial units in respect of Gross Income and Disposable Income.  Third, there 
is considerable stability in the coefficients of variation over time with the exception 
of the rural farm category.  The outcome for farm incomes is not unexpected given 
the inherent variability of farm income relative to wage income that would be the 
dominant source of earned income in urban and rural non-farm reas. 
 
Table 5: s-Convergence Within Urban and Rural Areas, 1987 and 1994 
Income Per Person Urban Rural-Farm Rural-Non-Farm 
 1987 1994 1987 1994 1987 1994 
Direct 102.8 103.2 84.3 75.7 116.0 112.4 
Gross 73.8 70.8 66.0 59.6   80.7   69.0 
Disposable 62.1 63.0 66.9 60.5   57.9   62.4 
Source: Anonymised CSO HBS files 
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Table 6 conducts a similar analysis within towns of different population levels.  
While we do not have a perfect match in terms of town size categories for the two 
years, there is nonetheless sufficient overlap to permit a comparison between the two 
years.  The coefficients follow a predictable pattern as far as income concept is 
concerned.  But more importantly there is a remarkable degree of constancy over the 
two periods.  These findings are consistent with the observation in NESC (1997) that 
inequality does not have a particular spatial manifestation.   
 
Table 6: s-Convergence Within Urban Areas By Population Size  
1987 and 1994 
 1987 1994 
 Income Per Person Income Per Person 
Town Size Direct Gross Disposable Direct Gross Disposable 
Dublin 98.1 72.0 60.6 96.3 68.8 62.0 
>10000 109.0 77.8 66.8    
>20000    110.7 71.4 62.5 
1500-10000 94.4  65.5 54.6    
3000-20000    99.6 68.7 60.4 
1000-3000    119.6 67.5 60.3 
<1500 113.4 74.5 61.2    
<1000    113.1 70.7 64.5 
Source: Anonymised CSO HBS files. 
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4. TOWARDS EXPLAINING INTER -REGIONAL WELFARE 
DIFFERENCES  
 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that a commitment by the State to an increased 
flow of permanent transfers to the weaker regions would bridge the income gap.  As 
to whether this would be a desirable policy stance will be addressed in Section 7.  
For now we consider an alternative strategy for achieving regional balance.  This 
strategy involves devising a set of policy instruments that promotes convergence in 
productivity levels measured as output per head.4 This policy, if successful, would 
lead to convergence in living standards without the requirement to support 
permanent transfers to the regions.  It is a policy that on the face of it is also 
consistent with the EU's Community Support Framework.  In order to judge the 
efficacy of such a policy stance it is useful to analyse the sources of regional 
variation in GVA per capita.   
 
The regional variation in GVA per capita t a point in time can be decomposed into 
four terms (see FitzGerald, Kearney, Morgenroth and Smyth (1999)) - productivity 
(GVA per worker), the employment rate, the participation rate and the dependency 
ratio: 
 
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+++=
SDR
iDRLog
SPR
iPRLog
SER
iERLog
SPROD
iPRODLog
SGVAC
iGVACogL (2) 
 
where, i = region; 
 s = the State; 
 GVAC = GVA per capita; 
 PROD = GVA per worker; 
 ER = Employment Rate, that is, the ratio of numbers employed to the  
  labour force; 
 PR = Participation Rate, that is, the ratio of the labour force to the  
  population aged 15 to 64 years;
 DR = Dependency Ratio which in this case is measured as the inverse of 
 the population aged 15 to 65 years to the totalpopulation, that is, 
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where, P<15+65> is the dependent population aged under 15 to over 
  65 and P1565 is the potential working population aged 15 to 65. 
 
The results of this decomposition are presented in Table 7 in respect of GVA per 
capita measured at basic prices for 1991 and 1996.  These findings clearly show that 
the dominant explanation for the inter-r gional variation in per capita GVA is 
productivity differentials.  Over the two years the variation in the employment rate, 
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the participation rate and the dependency ratio only ranges from 0 to about 6 percent.   
 
The substantial variation that is observed for productivity arises in turn from 
differences between regions in sectoral productivity levels and also in the regional 
variation in the sectoral distribution of employment. 
 
Table 7: Decomposition of Regional Variation in GVA per Capita  
(Log(Region/State) x 100) for 1991 and 1996 
Region GVA per 
 capita 
Employment 
 rate 
Participation 
rate 
Dependency
 rate* 
Productivity
rate** 
1991 
Border -18.09 -2.56 0.86 -4.82 -12.81 
Dublin 28.06 -2.01 1.62 6.37 22.69 
Mid-East -36.13 0.70 -2.93 0.00 -35.76 
Midland -31.03 1.91 -3.01 -3.64 -22.51 
Mid-West -6.80 1.87 -1.96 -1.23 -5.24 
South-East -9.56 -0.39 -1.17 -1.83 -7.15 
South-West 4.23 1.84 -1.38 -0.62 4.92 
West -26.70 3.60 0.76 -5.41 -27.93 
1996 
Border -26.16 -3.87 -0.15 -4.45 -21.04 
Dublin 28.70 -1.12 3.17 4.65 23.65 
Mid-East -18.57 3.05 7.34 -5.06 -16.47 
Midland -40.14 2.88 0.49 -3.82 -30.00 
Mid-West -10.86 3.08 -4.71 -1.29 -7.92 
South-East -11.26 -0.73 -1.63 -1.93 -11.26 
South-West 6.44 0.41 -2.66 -0.65 9.20 
West -30.70 0.56 -1.15 -4.45 -34.02 
*This value (say z) is related to the dependency ratio (dr) as dr=(1/z)-1. 
**1995 
Source: CSO (1998) and Department of Finance (1998). 
 
We can see this more formally by noting the following decomposition of inter-
regional productivity variation into the “within” and “between” sector effects 
(Broadberry, 1997): 
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where, i = region; 
 s = the State; 
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 j = the sector, that is, agriculture, industry or services; 
 W = sectoral employment share.
 
The productivity and employment share differentials are doubly weighted.  The first 
weighting factor is the average of the ratio of sector j's productivity to total 
productivity in region i and the State; and the second weighting factor is the average 
of the ratio of sector j's employment share in region i and the State.5 
 
The results of this decomposition are given in Table 8.  The results show that the
variation in sectoral employment shares is of minimal importance in accounting for 
inter-regional differences in productivity with the exception perhaps of the Mid-West 
region and to a lesser extent the West region.6 In other words, the variation in 
productivity across the regions cannot be wholly accounted by for the fact that some 
regions may have relatively high numbers engaged in agricultural activity.   
 
Table 8: Decomposition of Regional Variation in GVA per Worker  
(Log(Region/State) x 100) into ‘Within’ and ‘Between’ Sector Effects  
1991 and 1995 
Region "Within" sector 
effect 
"Between" sector 
effect 
Productivity 
1991 
Border -11.84 -0.94 -12.81 
Dublin 19.23 -0.40 22.69 
Mid-East -37.38 1.64 -35.76 
Midland -20.50 -2.10 -22.51 
Mid-West -0.66 -4.49 -5.24 
South-East -6.49 -0.58 -7.15 
South-West 4.64 0.27 4.92 
West -20.80 -7.16 -27.93 
1995 
Border -23.15 2.12 -21.04 
Dublin 29.67 -4.41 23.65 
Mid-East -19.27 2.50 -16.47 
Midland -27.12 -1.82 -30.00 
Mid-West -11.05 2.58 -7.92 
South-East -10.87 -0.82 -11.26 
South-West 10.81 0.39 9.20 
West -24.10 -7.77 -34.02 
Source: CSO (1998) and Department of Finance (1998). 
 
In Table 9 we provide a further decomposition of the total “within” sector variation 
by breaking out the contribution of the component sectors.  These data suggest for 
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the most part that the principal contributors to explaining inter-regio al variation are 
the industry and services sectors. There are clearly substantial variations in 
productivity to be observed for these sectors. In 1991, relatively low agricultural 
productivity in the West and Mid-West did account for a significant proportion of 
the overall variation in productivity but for the 1995 data it is apparent that the 
overwhelming source of variation across the regions is the productivity performance 
of the non-agricultural sectors.    
 
Table 9: Decomposition of Regional Variation in Total "Within"  Sector 
Productivity (Log(Region/State) x 100) into Sectoral Components 1991,1995 
Region Agriculture Industry Services Total 
1991 
Border -0.92 -4.29 -6.63 -11.84 
Dublin 0.89 6.03 12.31 19.23 
Mid-East 2.36 -15.86 -23.88 -37.38 
Midland -0.29 -15.68 -4.53 -20.50 
Mid-West -2.16 2.56 -1.05 -0.66 
South-East 1.53 -1.75 -6.26 -6.49 
South-West 3.08 6.51 -4.95 4.64 
West -4.81 -5.75 -10.24 -20.80 
1995 
Border 1.19 -15.32 -9.02 -23.15 
Dublin 2.00 9.03 18.65 29.67 
Mid-East -0.87 5.92 -24.32 -19.27 
Midland -0.66 -22.40 -4.06 -27.12 
Mid-West 0.70 -8.28 -3.48 -11.05 
South-East 0.69 -2.71 -8.86 -10.87 
South-West 2.18 14.63 -6.00 10.81 
West -4.57 -11.39 -8.13 -24.10 
Source: CSO (1998) and Department of Finance (1998). 
 
In the industrial sector, where overall productivity levels are highest, the Southwest 
and East regions have significantly higher levels reflecting the very high 
concentration of high value-add d manufacturing sectors around Dublin city and 
Cork city.  By contrast, productivity levels in manufacturing in the West, Border and 
Midland regions are particularly low.  As regards services there is a clear difference 
between the East and all other regions. The East has by far the highest regional 
concentration of services employment.  Furthermore, between 1991 and 1996 almost 
all of the increase in GVA per worker came from industry and services activities that 
are generally located in urban areas. 
 
5. THE URBAN FACTOR IN A STORY OF PRODUCTIVITY 
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DIFFERENCES  
 
Some Perspectives from the Endogenous Growth Literature 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the bulk of the significant inter-
regional variation in output per capita can be explained in terms of persistent 
productivity differences across the regions.  Moreover, these productivity differences 
are primarily due to “within” sector effects and the inter-regional variation is 
dominated by the industrial and services sectors.  Thus there are characteristics of 
the regions that give rise to fundamental differences in the productivity of these 
sectors.  To what factor or factors can these differences be attributed? Our view is 
that these significant productivity differences are clo ely related to the degree of 
urbanisation in the regions and in particular to the increasingly evident preference of 
multinational companies (MNCs) to locate in such centres (see O'Malley, 1994).7 
O'Malley argues that part of the explanation for this trend is due to the fact that the 
MNCs are predominantly engaged in activities of an increasing returns nature which 
tend to flourish in large urban centres.  Also the observation by NESC (1997) that 
“…almost 71 percent of the net increase in manufacturing and internationally 
traded services employment between 1986 and 1996 took place in the East region 
and the four counties containing the main urban centers…” provides prima facie 
evidence of the importance of the urban factor in explaining the concentratration of 
employment.  We will argue that there is strong theoretical support and some 
indicative empirical support for the urbanisation hypothesis. 
 
What Pritchett (1996) labels the “pro-natal” view stresses that population growth has 
pro-productivity eff cts of agglomeration and scale economies.  Indeed, economists 
have noted that we cannot rationalise the existence of cities without recourse to some 
story about agglomeration economies nor indeed can we explain why relatively 
highly skilled labour will migrate from relatively poor regions into richer regions 
(see Bradley, O'Donnell, Sheridan and Whelan (1995)).  Pritchett (1996) lists the 
potential agglomeration economies as being “… r duced transport costs; increased 
specialisation; within industry spillovers of innovations; [and] financing the fixed 
costs of social overhead capital”.  Krugman (1999) argues that it is difficult to better 
the threefold rationale offered for the existence of these agglomeration effects by 
Alfred Marshall, namely, “… the ability of producers to share specialised providers 
of inputs; the advantages to both employers and workers of a thick labour market; 
and localised spillovers of knowledge, especially through personal interaction”. 
 
Adam Smith first postulated the existence of a linear relationship between 
productivity and the level of employment (see Eltis, 1984).  Higher levels of 
employment create the potential for technological change - the ‘division of labour’.   
In the recent work of Romer (1994), Jones (1998) and others on endogenous growth 
the accumulation of ‘knowledge capital’ or ‘ideas capital’ plays a central role.  The 
non-rivalous nature of ideas provides an intellectually powerful argument for 
increasing returns.  While an idea might be expensive to create, once created it can
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be applied relatively costlessly to the production process.  Since constant returns can 
be motivated by the well-known argument of replication, given the non-rivalous 
nature of ‘ideas capital’, this implies that increasing returns in respect of all
production resources (labour, physical capital and ‘ideas capital’) will prevail.  The 
process of increasing returns therefore implies a feedback loop from population 
density through to higher productivity and back to density.  
 
Jones presents a simple “Isaac Newton” model to demonstrate the relationship 
between the growth in per capita output and the growth in population.  The key 
relationship in this framework is the postulate that the time derivative of ideas is a 
linear function of the labour force set aside to create these ideas (the “Isaac 
Newtons”).  And from first principles he can argue that increasing returns holds in 
respect of the accumulation of ideas.  His model predicts that the growth in 
productivity will be proportional to the growth in population with the factor of 
proportionality related to the degree of increasing returns to scale.  Jones is 
concerned primarily with rationalising global relationships between ideas 
accumulation and growth because as he noted the leakage of ideas across 
international boundaries implies that his results might not be supported by empirical 
studies which use cross-sections of countries as the unit of analysis.
 
We can adapt the Jones' model to the issue of inter-r gional productivity differences 
as long as we presume that the source of the productivity differential to be explained 
is not the accumulation of ideas but is rather a factor related to economies of scale or 
agglomeration.  In this case agglomeration or scale economies are tied to a particular 
geographical space and hence “leakage” as posited by Jones is not an issue. 
 
A number of model versions are possible which result in different predictable 
hypotheses.  Consider the following simple model: 
 
aad -=÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
iii
i
LKA
L
Y
    (4) 
 
( )
i
i R
L
Ad ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ= d    (5) 
 
where, Y = output; L = the labour input; A = productivity; K= the capital stock; and 
 R = the land area. 
 
In this model efficiency differences are a function of population density.  Taking 
logs of (4) and totally differentiating across space we have 
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Dividing (5) by A and taking logs across space we obtain at the “steady state” that  
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Substituting (7) into (6) we get 
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In other words, this simple model predicts that the log difference of labour 
productivity across regions will be a positive function of the l g of population 
density, if 0>d which implies increasing returns; a positive function of the regional 
capital stock and a negative function of the regional labour force. 
 
Some simple variants of this framework give equally interesting predictions.  If we 
assumed that efficiency differences were a linear function of the level of employment 
we can easily show that 
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In other words, the log of labour productivity is a positive function of the log f 
employment, if d > a and the log of the capital stock.   If, following Kremer (1993) 
we specified equation (5) as  
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the inter-regional variation in productivity is in er alia  positive function of the level
of population density or the level of employment. 
 
Kremer (1993) discusses a most interesting model where the log difference in 
productivity is a function of the level of employment/population.  His model also 
contains a simple Malthusian population adjustment mechanism that ensures a 
constant standard of living.  The surprising, and important, prediction of this model 
is that employment is a function of the level of population/employment.  The 
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intuitive basis of this model is that the gains from the accumulation of knowledge 
capital are principally to be found in increased population /employment rather than 
improvements in living standards.  Kremer tests his model with global population 
data stretching back to 1 million B.C. and finds strong statistical support for his 
theory.  Romer (1996) notes that the relationship between population growth and 
population level is constant in the latter period of Kr mer's sample and he speculates 
that this may be due to the breakdown of the simple Malthusian assumption.   
 
While this model was constructed to explain the endogenous growth potential of the 
accumulation of knowledge capital in an inter-country context it can be readily 
applied, like the Jones' model considered earlier, to the problem of explaining inter-
regional differences in employment growth.  There is of course not a perfect match.  
For one there will not be a perfect correlation between employment and population 
in the regions because of commuting and migration.  Second, and most 
fundamentally, the Malthusian assumption is especially flawed at the regional level.  
We can modify Kremer's model by assuming for instance that 
population/employment does not adjust to equate living standards across regions but 
instead is a function of the level of population/employment. 
 
Our re-worked version of Kremer's model is: 
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Solving this model for the inter-regional variation in employment, we get: 
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and substituting either iLb , or, iRL )/(b for iLogAd )( the model predicts a 
positive relationship between the inter-regional variation (log difference) in 
employment and the regional level of employment or the lev lof population density.  
Our analysis of the Jones and Kremer models suggests that if the urbanisation, and 
hence agglomeration economies, are of consequence then either the inter-r gional 
variation in labour productivity (log difference) or the regional variation in 
employment should be positive functions of the level of employment, or, the lev l of 
employment density.   
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The models we have discussed so far are consistent with an exogenous growth 
process.  The distribution of employment across space and its concentration can 
according to the framework affect both productivity and employment differentials 
but what causes the distribution to be as it is? More particularly is the evolving 
distribution the outcome of an endogenous process? To address this question we 
must take stock of history. 
 
Consider the following equation 
 
l
11 -- =- titit nLLL       (13) 
where i refers to some spatial entity, 
 t is some time period  
 n is the rate of growth in L.
 
As ingeniously noted by Jones (1998) this simple equation or “law of motion” 
endogenises growth through the relationship postulated for the existence of 
agglomeration economies in (5) in a maner which is identical to the many other 
models of endogenous growth which are available.  But more importantly it does so 
in a way that is not contrived or ad hoc.  If we define L as the population in a spatial 
entity with low or nil inward or outward migration and assume that l = 1, then (13) 
is no more than a statement that people, unlike machines, have the capacity to 
reproduce themselves.  Jones interprets n as a net fertility parameter being equal to 
the difference between the birth rate and the death rate. 
 
If we define L as employment, the linearity is not likely to be as robust a prediction 
at the regional level of analysis.  Nonetheless there would appear to be a strong 
parallel.  Vacancies will primarily emerge from existing employments and job deaths 
obviously will.  New investment will locate where existing firms are congregated 
especially if the kind of agglomeration economies that we have postulated exist.  Put 
simply large employment centers will grow ever larger.   
 
What is attractive about this s ory is its simplicity.  If there is any validity in this 
perspective then a cross-sectional regression  (across the spatial entities) of the 
growth in employment or population should produce at least a positive constant (that 
is, n > 0).  Should  exceed unity it would of course imply that population, or 
employment was on an unsustainable path.  It might be also reasonable to expect a 
different value for l in respect of population and employment change.  Given 
migration and commuting outside of a given spatial entity it seems reasonable to 
expect that l might be less than unity for population relative to employment.     
 
Urbanisation - Some Simple Empirical Tests
Primarily because of data limitations, both in terms of limited observations and the 
absence of certain variables, we do not claim that our empirical tests of the 
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urbanisation hypothesis are definitive or complete.  We are certainly not in a position 
to construct a full-scale model of regional production.  Rather our intention is to 
establish whether there is tentative evidence for the urbanisation hypothesis.  The 
greatest difficulty with any testing procedure in this context is to unravel the 
direction of causation.  Accordingly we claim no more for our simple empirical tests 
than that they provide evidence of correlation.  If such tentative evidence does not 
exist it is unlikely to emerge from a more comprehensive set of model tests. 
 
Our simple models suggest that the inter-r gional variation8 i  either labour 
productivity or employment should be positively related to either the level of 
employment or an index of density.  We can exploit three sources of data to shed 
light on these relationships, namely, the Regional Authority(RA) level data, the 
Household Budget Surveys (HBS)9 which provide a limited amount of spatial data 
and the Census of Industrial Production (CIP) which furnishes county-level 
observations on industrial productivity and employment.  We present the relevant 
correlation coefficients in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Correlation Coefficients for Tests of Simple Agglomeration Models   
Variation in: Level of Employment Density 
Regional Authority, 1995 
Productivity-industry 0.69 [0.77] 0.28 [0.26]* 
Productivity-services 0.66 [0.54] 0.36 [0.30]* 
Employment-industry 0.97 [….] 0.54 [0.48] 
Employment-services 0.96 [….] 0.59 [0.50] 
Census of Industrial Production, County Data, 1995 
Productivity-industry -0.69 [0.33] 0.29 [0.24]** 
Employment-industry  0.81  [….] 0.82 [0.73]** 
Household Budget Survey, Size of Urban Centres, 1994-95
Direct Income per capita 0.64*** 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the correlation coefficients for the log values. 
*  Population per square kilometer (excluding Dublin). 
**  Urbanisation index provided by NESC (1997) which is defined as the 
percentage of the population in settlements of 1,500 or greater. 
***  This correlation coefficient refers to the relationship between per capita direct 
income and town size for the urban centres given in Table 6. 
 
The coefficient values provide tentative support for the hypothesis of agglomeration 
economies associated with urbanisation. There is one exception that we shall come 
to later.  The results are especially strong when we use the level of employment as 
our index of urbanisation.  Also the suggestive evidence of an urbanisation effect is 
stronger for employment variation rather than productivity. 
 
The finding of a negative sign for the county productivity variation in the CIP data is 
consistent with the prediction in equations (8) and (9).  In the absence of county-
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based capital stock estimates we cannot test the model's predictions fully but it is 
useful to consider the following regression which involves regressing the variation in 
productivity on the level of employment and a density index and which generates 
significant coefficient values with the anticipated signs for both variables: 
 
 
Productivity Regression 
 
            Log (Productivity variation) = 119.6 - 67. 1 Log (L) + 98.58 Log (Density)   
                                            (0.78)   (2.64)                 (2.25) 
 R2 = 0.17; N=27 (t-statistics in parentheses). 
 
 
Population and Employment Dynamics 
 
We have tested our simple “law of motion” equation (13) on the lowest spatial unit 
which is feasible, namely, the District Electoral Division (DED) level, for the change 
in population and employment over the period 1986 to 1996.  The following results 
were obtained: 
 
Population change 1986-1996 
   n = 0.0228      l = 0.7855 
        (0.1315)            (0.8471) 
  R2 = 0.06; N=3421 (t-statistics in parentheses). 
 
Employment change 1986- 9 
   n = 0.0779      l = 1.1531 
        (4.9819)            (43.786) 
  R2 = 0.31; N=3421 (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
It is clear that at the level of the DED there is substantial noise to the extent that as 
far as population change is concerned both the value of n and   are not significantly 
different from zero.10 The magnitudes of these coefficients, especially l are 
nonetheless interesting.  Given that l is less than unity, the implication is that the 
growth in population across spatial units will fall to zero asymptotically.  In other 
words the prediction is that the growth rate in larger centres of population is much 
less than in smaller centres.  This point is noted using a different perspective to ours 
in NESC (1997). 
 
The results for employment change are the exact opposite to population and the 
coefficients are also statistically significant at the DED level.  The linearity of 
equation (13) is confirmed for employment.  This confirms the self-perpetuating 
nature of employment generation at the spatial level.  However, the coefficient is not 
exactly equal to unity and while it is numerically only marginally in excess of unity it 
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is nonetheless significantly different.  The practical significance of this result is that 
the growth of employment is increasingly positive in the level of employment.  For 
example, our results imply the following growth rates in employment by level of 
employment: 
 
  Employment  Growth Rate (%) 
 
  100,000   4.54 
  200,000   5.05 
  250,000   5.22 
  300,000   5.37 
  500,000   5.81 
 
 
6. CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE EXISTING URBAN HIERARCHY  
 
The preceding section stresses the importance of initial conditions in determining 
outcomes and especially the concentration of industrial and service activity in areas 
of high population density.  Policy can only start to make a difference by recognising 
the constraints imposed by history.  There are thus a number of aspects of population 
and settlement that are relevant to regional d velopment.  These include key 
variables related to functional specialisation, size, the location and position of urban 
centres within regional, country and international urban hierarchies (see Boeckout, 
Groenewegen and Romkema, 1995 and EU Commission, 1997).    
 
The overall density of population in Ireland is very low which has cost implications 
for the supply and maintenance of physical infrastructure and a variety of essential 
public and private services.  Throughout most rural areas the average densities a e 
less than 25 persons per sq. km..  This low overall density can be seen clearly in Map  
1 of population densities contained in the Appendix (Walsh,1996). 
 
The settlement pattern is particularly weak as Map 2 indicates.  Dublin metropolitan 
area is over five times the size of Cork.  There are only three other centres with more 
than 40,000 inhabitants.  All are located on the coast, thus significant portions of 
their potential hinterlands are absent.  Beyond the commuter hinterlands of the 
largest centres there are only another five centres with populations between 
approximately 18,000 and 30,000 - Dundalk, Drogheda, Kilkenny, Sligo and  Tralee 
(only Kilkenny is inland).  The settlement hierarchy is especially weak throughout 
most of the Border and West regions and in remote coastal parts of the Mid-West 
and South-West. 
 
The location, as well as the scale, of urban centers is clearly an important concern in 
the quest for strategies to effect a more balanced regional development.  We present 
in Map 3 an impression of the catchment areas of the principal urban centres by 
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using estimates of Travel to Work areas that are defined as 60 minutes or less 
commuting time from the centre of the designated urban area.  There are clearly 
large areas of the country that are remote from these larger centres.  There are some 
regions where the urban system is particularly weak and there are long distances 
between places.  This is particularly the case in the North-West and the eastern half 
of the West region and in parts of the Mid-West, South-West and Border regions. 
 
The pattern of recent population change is summarised  in Map 4.  In the most recent 
inter censal period, Galway was the most rapidly growing city, while Tralee had the 
highest growth rate among the next tier of towns.  There are risks of a cleavage 
emerging within the Midlands and parts of the South-East as the more accessible 
towns fall more under the influence of Dublin.  The total levels of population growth 
between 1981- 6 and 1991-96 were broadly similar, 97,238 and 100,368 
respectively.  However, the regional distribution of this population increase differed 
very much between the two periods.  In the early 1980s, 46 percent of the increase 
occurred in the East and 26 percent in the Border, Midlands and Southeast.  By the 
early I990s the proportions were 55 percent and 15 percent respectively.  Apart from 
the doubling of the level of population growth in Dublin city and county, the next 
highest level of population increase was in the West, mostly around Galway city. 
 
Detailed micro level analysis of the pattern of population change reveals the extent 
to which growth has been concentrated in and around the largest urban centres, 
followed by the county towns and their contiguous rural areas (Walsh, 1996).  
Corridors of growth can be detected in the rural areas adjacent to major sections of 
the national roads.  Finally, some growth is occurring in coastal areas and in some 
scenically attractive inland areas.  By contrast extensive areas of decline are evident 
throughout the North-West and West and in parts of the Midlands and central 
Munster.  The extent of decline is greatest in the relatively more rural tracts away 
from the national roads. 
 
7. THE BASIS OF REGIONAL POLICY  
 
To this point we have established that there exists core-periphery income dispersion 
in Ireland, that the tax-tr nsfer system already corrects much of this dispersion, that 
output per capita dispersion is explained in large part by productivity differences, 
that productivity dispersion cannot be explained in terms of sectoral composition of 
employment and that some form of aglomeration/urbanisation story is important in 
explaining regional productivity differences. 
 
The idea that a country may develop a core- eriphery regional structure is not new.  
What is new is (i) the understanding of the forces that give rise to this outcome and 
(ii) the identification of a link between growth performance and agglomeration.  
Insights into the evolution of regional differentiation has been provided by 
economists and geographers alike (see for example Krugman, 1991and Malecki 
1997).11  
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Our discussion in Section 5 has developed the analysis of the link between 
agglomeration and the inter-regional variation in productivity and employment 
generation.  The key empirical finding is that regional divergence appears to be an 
equilibrium phenomenon.  In this respect regional policy that seeks to eliminate this 
divergence must be seen as an attempt to alter this market outcome.  Justification for 
this policy must in turn be based on efficiency and/or equity grounds.  In this section 
we investigate whether a case for regional policy can be made on these grounds.  We 
sketch an analytical basis for regional and urban policy in Ireland and in so doing 
outline a policy direction that combines targets with respect to regional income 
differentials, growth and urban development. 
 
The central question concerns the implications of agglomeration effects for the 
design of regional policy.  Todate the welfare theoretic basis of regional p licy in 
such an environment has not been developed in a unified way.  There exists a 
literature on the efficiency basis of regional policy emanating, on the one hand, from 
the development literature and on the other from the analysis of fiscal federalism.  
Agglomeration effects have not been an important concern in the latter literature.  
Instead the concern has been with the optimality of the (labour) migration 
equilibrium and its dependence on the nature of the labour market and on federal to 
sub-federal fiscal relations.12 Agglomeration effects feature importantly in the urban 
economics literature.  Here the concern is with the optimal size of cities and whether 
market forces serve to create cities that are too large or too small. 
 
Regional and urban policy in Ireland has not to date been informed by the literature 
on fiscal federalism.13 Viewpoints have developed on targeted regional spending and 
urban planning that owe more to historical practice and the need to confront 
immediate constraints than any consistent analytical assessment.  Given the message 
in the earlier sections of this paper - that agglomeration is important for growth - ad 
hoc regional and urban policy is potentially costly. 
 
The basic question – “is it necessary to have policy conditioned by spatial 
variables?” – is usually not asked.  More often than not it is assumed that 
government should have a regional policy.  However, this is by no means axiomatic 
and especially in a very small, very open economy.  In Ireland no potential Pareto 
improvements may arise as a consequence of adding a spatial category to the 
available set of policy instruments.14 We believe the potential regional policy 
interventions which require consideration are policies of redistribution and policies 
related to urbanisation.   
 
Policies of Redistribution 
Governments use a combination of a progressive income tax and a targeted transfer 
system to effect a transfer of resources from the better off to the poorer members of 
society.  It is reasonable to suppose that governments are concerned to affect this 
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redistribution in the most efficient way.15 
 
We have demonstrated that income differentials exist across regions in Ireland.  
Setting aside the issue of the intra-region income distribution - which is tackled in a 
similar way across regions - we can ask whether regional differences in average 
income suggest that a spatial category would be a useful instrument of targeted 
transfer policy? If the answer is in the affirmative we have a basis for a regional 
policy which might involve transfers from richer to poorer areas. 
 
For simplicity, imagine a situation where we have a two-region country where one 
region is designated as rich and the other as poor.  The basis for income differences 
derives from differences in labour productivity.  Welfare is linearly related to income 
if working and to the value of leisure if unemployed.  In this situation we ask 
whether it is efficient to subsidise employment in the poorer region via a wage 
subsidy or the creation of a job.  The question is answered by comparing the shadow 
wage to the market wage.16 
 
The optimality of the regional employment policy depends on the way it affects the 
labour migration equilibrium between the rich and the poor region.  Boadway and 
Flatters (1981) find that a general presumption in favour of this policy depends on 
the absence of a transfer programme such as unemployment insurance.  We call this 
the no government case in that the general basis for regional policy depends on the 
absence of a standard instrument of government policy.  The message here is that, in 
general, regional categorisation cannot be presumed to improve on policy 
implementation that can categorise by employment status.17 
 
Let us continue to work in terms of a two-region country.  Now, however, we impose 
a federal system of government.  Each region has a government and in addition there 
exists a common upper level of government.  Given the previous result one might 
imagine that more government would further undermine the case for regional policy. 
This will not be the case.  The reason for this relates to the existence of common 
property and the ability of regional government to exploit property specific to its 
region. 
 
There is an extensive literature dealing with this case which dates from Buchanan 
(1950).  It involves taking account of the dependence of welfare on (local) public 
goods in addition to private goods.  By local we mean that the consumption of the 
public good requires residence in the region of provision.  Once welfare is model d 
in this way we see that regional post-tax income differentials (measuring as they do 
private good consumption) are perfectly consistent with migration equilibrium. 
 
Migration interacts with the provision of public goods in that migrants give rise to 
congestion in usage of public goods but also contribute to the cost of provision.  The 
difference between the tax payment and the congestion cost is called a fiscal 
externality.  The migration equilibrium will be inefficient to the extent that the fiscal 
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externalities are not equal across regions.  This problem will be exacerbated to the 
extent that there is rent generating regional specific common property. 
 
Boadway and Flatters (1982) conclude that this framework generates the following 
policy conclusions: (i) one cannot expect in general that migration decisions in a 
decentralised federal economy will lead to an efficient allocation of labour over 
regions, (ii) self-interested regional governments acting on behalf of their residents 
have an incentive to take budgetary actions that, from a federal point of view, lead to 
inefficiencies, (iii) the federal government faced with these inefficiencies and 
inequities will be justified in using a system of inter-regio  transfers as part of its set 
of policy instruments in seeking national objectives. 
 
This is a strong case for a regional policy.  It involves taking from richer regions and 
giving to poorer.  The form of this transfer, as analysed by Boadway and Flatters 
(1982), involves untied transfers which are budget balancing at national level.   It is 
not a regional policy as defined in the previous case.  However, as Myers (1990) 
demonstrates, the case for federal intervention depends on the regions not being able 
to make payments to each other.  This then raises the question of the form of 
government itself.  We now turn to this question.
 
The case for regional policy can be made when regional governments co-exist with a
federal level of authority.  The strength of the case depends on the set of transfer 
instruments assigned to regions.  The question of the efficacy of regional policy then 
seems to turn on the existence of a federal or a unitary State.  In turn this leads us to 
ask whether it is possible to make a case for a federal as opposed to a unitary form of 
government? 
 
Practitioners of political science frequently address this type of question.  A view on 
this issue is crucial to resolving differences over design of future institutional 
structures in the European Union.  The economics of fiscal federalism tt mpts to 
address this question by identifying those aspects of public intervention appropriate 
for action by different levels of government.  This work is often used as the basis for 
a policy of subsidiarity – assign a policy to the lowest level of government consistent 
with efficient implementation.  This literature would suggest that redistribution is 
best assigned to the highest level of government. 
 
Dixit and Londregan (1998) note that in practice, lower levels of government have 
access to many policy instruments which have a redistributive dimension.  They 
analyse the politics of redistribution in a federal and unitary states, noting the 
importance of analysing strategic interaction between the federal and regional level 
in the former.  The critical point emerging from the Dixit and Londregan analysis is 
to recognise the importance of history.  National regional policy, given a concern for 
redistribution, will differ as between a federal and unitary State.  Once the 
constitutional decision is made the idea is to implement policy appropriate for that 
structure and not the other.  However, it also means that the winners and losers from 
  185
redistribution are to some extent pre-select d as a consequence of constitutional 
decision. 
 
All of this discussion has weaved through a set of models.  The simple conclusion is 
that there is no general presumption in favour of regionally-based tr nsfer policy as a 
supplementary category for targeted taxation and welfare transfers.  What is optimal 
depends on the form of government and in particular the interaction between central 
and regional redistributive politics.  For as long as Ireland remains a unitary State we 
argue that there is no basis for a regionally-based transfer policy at all.  To the extent 
that there may be a defensible spatial dimension to government redistributive policy 
it ought to be related to the exploitation of economies that may arise from 
agglomeration.  It is to this issue we now turn. 
 
Policies Relating to Urbanisation 
There exists an extensive economics and geography literature on optimal city size 
distribution.  One aspect of this literature relates to the pricing of infrastructure and 
the relationship between congestion and under-pricing.  It is this aspect that has seen 
its way into the Irish policy debate on urbanisation - w thout, it must be said, having 
any effect on policy.  This has had the effect of generating an unbalanced set of 
recommendations.  It also has generated an uneasy alliance between those who think 
that Irish cities - principally Dublin - are too big and those who are disposed to see 
the problem as merely one of under pricing.  We will demonstrate in this section that 
it is important to distinguish between two location decisions - the location of 
employment and the residence of people - in framing an urbanisation policy. 
 
Consider first a caricature of conventional wisdom on urbanisation.  The belief is 
that economic growth has, through employment growth, generated more car usage.  
City roads are unpriced and the policy of major expansion of inner city roads has 
ceased.  Hence congestion develops.  The solution, it is argued involves a 
combination of road pricing and increased public transportation, principally in the 
form of buses. 
 
It is our view that this policy is not only unworkable but also undesirable as stated.  
In order to see this the first thing to note about commuting is that it is time and not 
distance that matters.  Once this is understood one can begin to approach the 
urbanisation question in a balanced way. 
 
An urbanisation policy can be framed in terms of a simple model of optimal city size.  
Assume that a person is equally likely to obtain planning permission to build, be it a 
house or a business, in any part of the country.  In this circumstance would we expect 
individual self-interested actions to lead to a pattern of agglomeration different to 
that which could be judged to be in the public interest? The answer depends on the 
presence or absence of external scale economies. 
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According to Papageorgiou and Pines (1998) an external scale economy is said to 
exist when the marginal social surplus (that arises from accomodating an individual 
in the city at the equilibrium utility level) exceeds the marginal private surplus 
(associated with the individual living and working in the city).  An external 
diseconomy can be defined in an analogous fashion.  It is not possible, however, to 
link excessive agglomeration, or dispersion, in a linear fashion with the existence of 
a diseconomy or an economy at the margin.  The reason for this i  that the externality 
as defined is in fact the sum of two externalities.  This, as Papageorgiou and Pines 
(1998) note, has given rise to some confusion in the urban economics literature.  
Depending on which of the externality generators is emphasised the conclusion 
regarding the effect of agglomeration can differ.18 
 
Here we give an intuitive interpretation of the sources of externality.  It links with 
our analysis of the relationship between agglomeration and productivity in Section 5 
and provides a framework for policy formulation.  The marginal social surplus is the 
difference between marginal social product and the cost of providing the individual 
with the consumption bundle consistent with the equilibrium utility level.  This is a 
more general variant of the fiscal externality we discussed earlier in relation to fiscal 
federalism.  Here the driving element is the idea of agglomeration across all (private 
good) producers in the city – the marginal product depends on the number of other 
producers.  There it arose from scale economies in the production of the public good 
alone.  In the formal modeling we can allow for local public goods but this is not a 
necessary requirement. 
 
The marginal private surplus depends on the difference between the wage and the 
market cost of acquiring the consumption bundle consistent with the equilibrium 
utility.  The issue of optimal city size distribution in a State now reduces to the 
equalisation of external scale economies across cities.  There is no reason to expect 
that the market will generate such equalisation.  Hence, in the same way that we 
could argue for regional policy in a federal State, we can argue for urban policy in a 
unitary State.  In this case the generators of the case for policy intervention are 
externalities that arise from employment location and settlement patterns for any 
given public infrastructure (or set of local public goods). 
 
This characterisation of the optimal city depends on the assumption that the location 
of employment and population settlement constitute the outcomes of the one 
decision.  If this assumption is dropped we can characterise optimal employment 
location and optimal settlement separately.  In order to clarify these issues we can 
rearrange the social and private surplus concepts. First, define the employment 
surplus as the difference between marginal social product and the wage.  Second, 
define the settlement surplus as the difference between the market and social cost of 
the equilibrium utility consumption bundle.  We now define an optimal allocation as 
a pair (employment distribution, settlement distribution) such that conditions one and 
two are equalised across cities.
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If people must live where they work - a t aditional industrial revolution view - th  
dichotomy suggested above does not hold.  This view was in fact industrial policy 
following the industrial revolution.  Witness the construction of workers housing.  In 
fact we could argue, following Marglin (1974), that the very success of the factory 
system depended on gathering together workers in the same place.  This was in 
contrast to the putting-out system where the entrepreneur concentrated production 
via his mobility rather than that of the workers.  A twentieth century view of urban 
planning - and here we are not imagining information age cities - should be built on 
the idea that employment location and settlement are distinct decisions.  The policy 
intervention is to facilitate the dichotomy via transport networks based on the 
minimisation of commuting time subject to a variety of constraints related to cost of 
provision and equalisation of land rents along with the optimal employment and 
settlement location conditions. 
 
A specific solution to this policy problem for a country would be a challenging 
exercise.  However, the framing of the problem can itself yield a guide to policy 
design.  Consider, for instance, the case for the pricing of city roads.  For given 
infrastructure this will frustrate an attempt by individuals to dichotomise the 
employment and settlement decisions.  With given wage levels it reduces private 
surplus thereby reducing welfare for non-city dwellers.  This can in turn lead to 
upward wage pressure that serves to undermine the exploitation of agglomeration 
economies.  This is not to argue against pricing in any circumstance.  Rather it has a 
place at the margin in allocating the use of facilities, given the optimal size of the 
city (as determined by employment concentration) and the optimal settlement pattern 
(as determined by commuting time, all other things being equal). 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
If there is a role for policy in promoting a more balanced regional development 
which is driven by productivity fundamentals the preceding section suggests that 
recognition of the role of key urban centres in developing their hinterlands has to be 
a critical feature of such a policy.  If regional spaces are to have any functional 
meaning in this paradigm, other than mere lines on a map, they must be organised 
around strong urban centres.  This paradigm has clear implications for the planning 
of settlement patterns and transport systems. If policy determines that balanced 
development can be achieved through a permanent flow of transfers then there is no 
requirement for regions to have a functional orientation, that is they can function 
merely as tags.  In this paper we have established that there is no basis for an Irish 
regional policy of the latter type.  Introducing a regional tag will not improve upon 
existing categorical data used in the tax and transfer system.  
 
Irish regional policy must thus be based on productivity fundamentals.  Our analysis 
suggests that the only feasible way to do this involves a policy of planned 
urbanisation.  To frame such a policy we must begin by asking whether we have the 
optimal settlement pattern? For this consideration we might turn again to Map 3 that 
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has been discussed in Section 6.  Casual empiricism suggests that the commuting 
area is very small to our large cities.  This would be expected to cause excessive 
inner city area rents combined with excessive usage of public facilities at the same 
time as we observe under-utilised facilities and low rents elsewhere.  It is time to 
commute and not distance that determines the spatial dispersion with respect to 
employment and settlement.  Dedicated lines of transport are the only way to 
increase speeds and maintain safety.  The only way to achieve this is through a 
network of train services (extending, for instance, in the Dublin area for up to 80 
kilometres). 
 
As noted in Section 6 there exist only a handful of urban centres in Ireland with the 
appropriate range of facilities and more importantly with the potential for the 
generation of agglomeration economies.  It may be thus justified to target public 
investment in the transport, social infrastructure and human capital areas to these 
centres to enable them to become internationally competitive and realistic 
alternatives to Dublin.  We are loath, however, to suggest that such resources should 
be transferred at the expense of Dublin since the latter continues to enjoy substantial 
advantages as a centre of high employment and agglomeration economies.  There is 
clearly scope for imaginative solutions to the financing the infrastructural 
requirements in Dublin and other centres that involve State and private partnerships 
(see Farrell, Grant, Sparks, 1998).   
 
The most appropriate choice for regional centres would appear to be Cork, Limerick 
(including Ennis and Shannon), Galway and Waterford.  In the Northwest Derry - 
Letterkenny presents itself as an almost natural regional centre.  Here the cross-
border link is particularly important since Letterkenny on its own is not sufficiently 
large to develop into a major centre.  Derry which has been identified as an 
important cross-border gateway and centre with a high growth potential (Department 
of the Environment for Northern Ireland, 1997) would benefit significantly from an 
enlargement of its hinterland into Donegal. 
 
The recent ESRI report on national investment priorities (FitzGerald et al, 1999) has 
strongly recommended that a national spatial development strategy should be 
formulated that would examine, among other issues, the best options and strategies 
for achieving the goal of balanced regional development. The two reports prepared 
by Fitzpatrick and Associates (1999a, 1999b) for the two new “super” Regional 
Authorities set out a preliminary framework that links proposals for investment in 
infrastructure to a hierarchy of regional and local centres. This framework is 
designed to take into account both the inter-urban functional linkages and the 
relationships between urban centres and their rural hinterlands. These studies provide 
a foundation for a more comprehensive strategy for sustainable regional 
development as we come to the turn of this century.   
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Endnotes 
 
1. Where variable y and x have a bivariate normal distribution, as is likely in the 
case of Barro regressions, a regression of y on x will tend to produce a slope less 
than unity. 
2. Quah’s (1993) methodology permits us, for instance, to test for he existence of 
“growth clubs” or multiple nodes in the evolving cross-country income 
distribution. 
3. The data are not adjusted for inflation because as noted earlier we have no basis 
for determining region-specific deflators. 
4. Specific interventions might be related to the dispersal of productive factors and 
public goods. 
5. The decomposition in (3) is a linear approximation and hence and the “within” 
and “between” sector effects will not always add up to the total inter-region l 
variation in productivity.  The accuracy of the approximation depends on the 
inter-regional variation in the weights and this is why we have based the weights 
on the average of the regional and State values. 
6. A caveat must be entered to this comment.  Broadberry (1997) points out that it 
is unreasonable to assume that a sector's productivity would be unaffected by a 
significant labour outflow.  In the case of the agricultural sector, for instance, the 
international evidence presented by Broadberry suggests that over time the 
apparently high productivity of the agricultural sectors observed for most 
countries is explained by the substantial labour outflows that have occurred from 
the sector.  When he adjusts for this factor he finds that much more of the inter-
temporal variation in productivity is attributable to the “between” sector or 
employment share effect than would be indicated by the direct application of (3).  
It is not clear, however, that this concern applies with equal force to the cross-
sectional case.      
7. It is well known that the level of labour productivity is exaggerated for a handful 
of multinational sectors relative to both indigenous sectors and to EU norms and 
that this is probably due to transfer pricing (see Honohan, Maitre and Conroy, 
1998). 
8. The inter- egional variation is expressed as the log (region/all regions)*100. 
9. It should be noted that the HBS data provide an estimate of per capita h usehold 
income so this data cannot provide a strict test of our agglomeration models. 
10. In fact when we ran the regression u ing county level data we obtained virtually 
identical results but given the relative absence of noise at the higher level of 
aggregation the coefficients were now found to be statistically significant. 
11. A particular appeal of the economic geography literature associated with 
Krugman is the characterisation of this process as an equilibrium phenomenon. 
12. Similar tools of analysis can be used to examine capital location. 
13. McCarthy and McCarthy (1989) drew on this literature in their examination of 
the of inter-country transfer policy in the European Union. 
14. A Pareto improvement implies that one party can be made better off in welfare 
terms without making any other party worse off. 
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15. Efficiency is defined here in terms of the Pareto criterion as in previous footnote. 
16. See Boadway and Flatters (1981) for the full exposition of this model.  This type 
of regional policy is an example of the regional investment strategy that we 
discussed in earlier sections.  The Boadway and Flatters analysis, however, does 
not model the agglomeration-type effects that we considered in Section 5. 
17. Again note that our views on what might constitute an appropriate regional 
investment strategy are based on an agglomeration story. 
18. It should be emphasised that this literature, as is true also in the economic 
geography literature, relies on specific functional forms in deriving results.  In 
addition results then are not unambiguous.  Their benefit, however, is to facilitate 
logical discussion of complex phenomena. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Professor P.J. Drudy: I am very pleased to propose the vote of thanks to the 
authors.  They have produced a very interesting and useful paper on regional 
disparities and I congratulate them on it.  It may be noted that when they started this 
work, they were dealing with eight Re ional Authorities and eight regions.  
However, as a result of our negotiations for Objective 1 status in relation to structural 
funding, we now have only two regions officially - one incorporating the Border, 
West and Midlands and the other containing the remaining five regions.  For those of 
us who are anxious to assemble data on a regional basis, I would plead with our 
colleagues in the C ntral Statistics Office to continue to assemble data at least on the 
former regional authority basis.  
 
The authors first examine a number of indicators of regional disparity, for examle 
Gross Value Added, Direct Income and Disposable Income.  They rightly raise a 
number of concerns regarding the use of Gross Value Added (roughly the equivalent 
of Gross Domestic Product) and they conclude that it is “a very deficient index of 
economic welfare”.  In particular, there is the difficulty of profit repatriation by 
multinational companies which results in an apparent increase in national income, 
but which does not of course accrue to the residents.  At a regional level, the use of 
this concept is also problematic since those producing the Gross Value Added in one 
region may in fact be residing and spending in another, again giving an inaccurate 
picture of regional income.  The authors also use the concepts of Direct Income and 
Disposable Income based on the Hous hold Budget Surveys.  Despite some obvious 
shortcomings, I would argue that the concept of Disposable Income is the preferable 
measure of well-being. 
 
Using these various indicators, the authors examine the important question as to 
whether or not convergence is taking place between regions.  Despite the widespread 
popular belief that poor regions remain poor while rich regions get richer, there is in 
fact a good deal of international evidence to show that convergence between regions 
does take place.  In an Irish context, the authors show that no regional convergence 
can be identified using Gross Value Added.  However, using the other, arguably 
more appropriate, income concepts, they arrive at a rather different conclusion, with 
evidence of convergence for most of the period up to the late 1980's and less 
evidence of marked disparities between regions than would be obvious using Gross 
Value Added. 
 
The findings raise serious concerns regarding the traditional, and even current, 
stance adopted by some commentators suggesting a continuing dichotomy between 
the ‘prosperous’ East of the country and the ‘poorer’ West.  I also would argue that it 
is more complex than that.  Recent research shows that poor people are not in fact 
confined to a particular part of Ireland.  They live in Dublin as well as elsewhere 
throughout the country.  This contention is backed up by research using a range of 
indicators such as migration, employment growth and unemployment.  Let us look 
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briefly at these indicators.  For example, the Dublin region has long been perceived 
as a region which recorded net immigration.  This was indeed true up to the mid 
1970s.  However, since then it has recorded net out-migrati n in all intercensal 
periods.  Its rate of net out-migration was second highest, after the Midlands, over 
the long period from 1971-1996. 
 
Turning to employment, the Dublin region recorded a net loss of 29,200 jobs, or 24 
percent, in industry including manufacturing over the period 1971-1997.  While it 
showed a modest net gain during the 1990s, this was significantly less than any other 
region.  The adjoining Mid East showed solid gains but did not counteract the 
overall losses in the east of the country.  The same conclusion can be reached using 
unemployment.  In 197 , the Dublin region had the second lowest rate of 
unemployment in the country.  By 1997, it had the second highest rate.  In the same 
year, Dublin also had the highest rate of long-term male unemployment in the State.  
It was closely followed by the Mid East.  These pieces of evidence lend support to 
the overall conclusions reached by the authors that “inequality does not have a 
particular spatial manifestation”. 
 
The paper goes on to analyse the reasons for variations in Gross Value Added at a 
regional evel and provides convincing evidence that 'productivity' is a crucial 
explanatory variable.  This seems to arise from differences in the various sectors of 
employment and in the sectoral distribution of employment, especially in industry 
and services.  The authors show that the main improvement in Gross Value Added 
over time resulted from high value-added employment in the main urban centres.  
This leads them to investigate the relevance of agglomeration economies.  Drawing 
on a range of authors from Marshall to Krugman, they provide a reasoned rationale 
and some evidence to support a policy of concentration rather than dispersal.  In 
contrast, they cast doubt on the broad-based ispersal-type regional policy which has 
been pursued in Ireland for many years.  In effect, they are returning to the debate 
which raged in the late 1960s when the Buchanan Report on Regional Studies in 
Ireland called for a 'growth centre' policy. 
 
At that time such an approach was rejected by the government because it received 
such opposition from the general public and from politicians whose constituencies 
were excluded from the favoured 'growth centre' status.  There are many who will 
still be opposed to such an approach, but it does make economic and social sense to 
build up a range of significant urban centres around the country in order to act as 
‘countermagnets’ to Dublin as well as to serve as focal points for development in 
their own regions.  This would reduce the inflationary and other pressures being 
created in cities such as Dublin, while making better use of under-utilised esources 
in other regions.  Such an approach should not of course preclude the need to give 
active encouragement to fully utilise the resources and potential of agricultural areas, 
small towns and villages.  The authors are to be complimented for raising this 
fundamental issue again.  I would like to thank the authors for a thoughtful, well-
argued and timely paper. 
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Dr. Eoin O’Leary: It is my privilege to be invited by the Statistical and Social 
Inquiry Society to second the vote of thanks on this thought provoking paper from 
Gerry, Tom and Jim.  The growth performance of different regions in Ireland has 
recently attracted much interested.  It is not only appropriate for the Society to have 
a paper in this area, but it is especially welcome that the authors are drawn from the 
disciplines of economics and geography, which is an interesting and worthwhile mix 
in the context of the burgeoning interest in economic geography. 
 
My comments on the paper are in five sections.  I begin with some general comments 
and continue with more detailed comments on the measurement of regional income 
using the regional accounts, the use of regional income measures from the 
Household Budget Survey (HBS), and on the analysis presented on the degree of 
convergence among Irish regions.  This is followed by some concluding remarks. 
 
General Comments 
The authors begin by asserting that policies of re-d stribution that have an explicit 
regional emphasis are unlikely to be justified in Ireland’s unitary State.  They 
proceed to explore the extent of regional income convergence among Irish regions 
using Gross Value Added (GVA) estimates from the Regional Accounts and income 
measures from the HBS.  They propose that urbanisation and, in particular, 
agglomeration economies are the key factors in explaining the inter-re ional 
productivity differences they observe.  Overall, by raising these important and 
interesting issues they have offered a worthwhile paper.  However, the argument 
presented is severely constrained by measurement difficulties, to which I now turn.   
 
Measurement of Regional Income using the Regional Accounts 
In order to measure regional income, the authors use GVA from the Regional 
Accounts.  This source, which has been published by the CSO since 1991, is the 
definitive source of regional output data since it is based on the national accounting 
framework.  The authors state that GVA, which is similar to GDP, is a misleading 
measure of regional income mainly due to the presence of significant profit outflows 
attributable to foreign multi-nationals.  These outflows have represented 15 percent 
of GNP in recent years, resulting in a gap between GDP and GNP which is 
unprecedented by international standards.  For example, the average gap for EU-15 
countries in 1995 was 0.8 percent, with Sweden (4.2 percent) and Finland (3.5 
percent) being the nearest to Ireland, and at the other extreme, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands having GNP levels in excess of GDP (Eurostat, 
1998).  In common with many other studies (O’Connor, 1999; O’Leary, 1998), the 
authors are content to refer to this drawback as on page 160.  However, by not 
making any adjustment to account for these outflows they are implicitly assuming 
that profit outflows are regionally distributed in proportion to regional GVA.  This 
assumption is not warranted since it is well known that multi-national activity is 
concentrated in the Dublin/Mid-East, Border and South-West regions.     
  202
 
Some estimates I have recently made (O’Leary, 1999) show that when profit 
outflows are distributed using each regions share of the remainder of net 
manufacturing output accounted for by foreign owned firms, the levels and rankings 
of estimated regional income (which is equivalent to regional ‘GNP’) are changed 
significantly.  It should be noted that my methodology does not, in common with the 
authors, allow for inter-regional price differences due to data unavailability.  Table 1 
shows the effect of this adjustment for 1995.  Two of the three regions with a 
concentration of multi-na onals are severely effected.  The South-West decreases by 
10 percentage points, while the Border decreases by 6.5 points due to the relative 
importance of multi-nationals in these regions.  The Dublin/Mid-East region 
increases slightly relative to the average because, although 39 percent of foreign 
owned profit is estimated to flow from there, this region accounts of 47 percent of 
GVA.  It is noticeable that the ranking of the Border region drops from 5th to 7th on 
the income basis, with the Midlands and West each gaining a place. 
 
Table 1: GVA and Regional Income per capita in 1995 (State = 100) 
Region GVA per Capita Regional Income per Capita 
Border 
Dublin/Mid-East 
Midlands 
Mid-West 
South-East 
South-West 
West 
77.2 
121.0 
71.8 
94.6 
86.4 
106.2 
70.0 
70.7 
124.6 
80.7 
95.5 
87.5 
96.2 
71.7 
State    100.0     100.0 
Source: O’Leary (1999). 
 
It is difficult to adjust for the problem of workers commuting between regions which 
distorts GVA as a measure of income.  The best course of a tion is to treat Dublin 
and the Mid-East as one region since the problem is most severe there.  Although the 
authors are aware of this problem they do not take this step.  However, it should be 
noted that other regions are undoubtedly also affected by this problem. 
 
Regional Income Measures from the Household Budget Survey 
The authors suggest on page 161 that income measures from the HBS are a more 
comprehensive estimate of personal incomes than the GVA measure.  I have to take 
issue with this assertion for three reasons.   
 
First, all data in the HBS are self reported which leads in the case of income, and 
certain items of expenditure like alcoholic drink, to under-rep rting.  This source of 
non-sampling error is clearly highlighted by the CSO, who warn, for example, that 
the gap between disposable income and total expenditure is more that could be 
attributed to definitional and time reference details (CSO, 1997).  In order to achieve 
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an appreciation of the extent of the under-r porting, we can  compare the HBS to the 
national accounts.  We find that in 1995, for example, direct income and disposable 
income from the HBS are approximately 53 percent of personal income from the 
national accounts.  Because of definitional and time frame differences these 
percentages are only indicative of the level of under-reporting in the HBS, which 
does seem to be quite significant.  Furthermore, we cannot adopt the assumption that 
the extent of this non-sampling error is distributed uniformly across regions.  Once 
again the CSO warn us that income understatement varies by type and source of 
income (CSO, 1997).  Thus, for example, if we are to assume that the self- mployed
persons are more likely to under-report than the PAYE sector, then regions with a 
preponderance of self employed farmers would have more unreliable estimates of 
income than other regions. 
 
Second, the HBS is a sample survey where the responding sample is approximately 
8,000 households covering 26,000 persons which is equivalent to roughly 0.75 
percent of the population.  The sample sizes for the some of the regions are quite 
small.  For example, the numbers sampled in the Mid-West, which has a population 
of 317,000, is approximately 2,000 persons or 0.6 percent.  The CSO present the 
standard errors of estimates for the population as a whole.  For the income measures 
used by the authors the standards errors vary between 2-3 perc nt of the average 
(CSO, 1997).  However, the CSO warn that the magnitude of the standards errors 
increase as smaller sub-samples are taken (CSO, 1997).  Thus, for example, the 
standard errors for the income estimates for the Mid-West are likely to be much 
greater than 2-3 percent.  This implies that we must be conscious, in making 
comparisons between regions over time, of the danger of reaching conclusions that 
are statistically insignificant.   
 
Third, it is hard to justify the statement the authors make on page 166, that direct 
income from the HBS reflects underlying productivity relationships.  The HBS 
provides income and not output data, which is necessary for productivity 
measurement.  Indeed, later in the paper the authors implicitly accept this point as 
they use GVA and not income in their decompositions in section 4.   
 
In conclusion, it is clear that regional income estimates from the HBS should be used 
with great care due to the extent of both non-sampling and sampling error in them.  
In no way can they be regarded as superior to the GVA estimates. 
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Analysis of Convergence Among Irish Regions
The authors proceed to measure the extent of regional convergence in Ireland in the 
context of the literature on economic growth and convergence.  The convergence 
process is not in any way automatic.  Where it occurs, it involves relatively poor 
regions catching-up on relatively rich regions over long time periods.  In effect, 
poorer regions converge by offering higher marginal returns on capital and by 
possessing an enhanced ability to transfer technologies from other regions, whether 
at home or abroad.  It is important to note that in order to benefit from technological 
transfer, regions must host traded industries.  When productivity convergence occurs 
in this way then living standards convergence should follow, in principle. 
 
In analysing the results presented by the authors on the degree of convergence 
between Irish regions, I have five comments to make.  These comments follow 
Sections 3 through 7 in sequence.  
 
First, the measure of g convergence used by the authors, in combination with the 
widely used s convergence measure, has been proposed by Gerry and Tom 
elsewhere (Boyle and Mc Carthy, 1997and 1999).  This is a useful contribution to 
the literature as it provides a simple summary measure of convergence. 
 
Second, the convergence process takes place over the long run, which in practical 
terms means at least two or three decades.  It is not very meaningful to estimate the 
degree of convergence over six consecutive years as is done for the GVA data.  This 
is especially so during the 1990s in Ireland, which has been a period of 
unprecedentd prosperity, which has been significantly affected by cyclical factors.  
The average annual growth rate of Irish GDP was 4.9 percent between 1991 and 
1996, which compares to an average of 3.2 percent per annum between 1945 and 
1996.  
 
The authors may point to the absence of regional GVA estimates before 1991.  
However, O’Connor (1999) uses a number of sources, including Henry (1997), 
which contain regional GVA estimates for 1979.  The authors present convergence 
results for the period 1973 to 1993 using the HBS data. although based on my earlier 
comments, these results should be treated with caution.  Furthermore, the availability 
of GVA estimates for 1979 and the 1990s, implies that an alternative data source 
exists which has more comprehensive coverage and is more reliable.   
 
Third, the authors also present convergence results within urban and rural areas.  
However, it is not clear why this classification is being analysed.  For example, will 
the convergence mechanism operate within rural areas where by definition, 
agriculture will predominate.  I think that in studying regional convergence we 
should be careful in selecting regions that contain a mix of industry and services as 
well as agriculture.  
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Fourth, the authors find some evidence of living standards convergence before 1987 
when the economy was in a slump and divergence afterwards when the economy was 
booming.  I should note that these findings are similar to those by Chatterji and 
Dewhurst (1996) for English, Welsh and Scottish regions.  Using a number of 
decomposition’s the authors then find that the proximate cause of the divergence 
observed between 1991 and 1996 is growing labour productivity differences.  In 
their second decomposition of inter-regional productivity into ‘within’ and ‘between’ 
sector effects, the authors find that ‘within’ sector effects are more important.  This 
result is not surprising, given that sectoral employment shares are not likely to 
change much over six consecutive years.  However, ‘between’ sector effects have 
been found to be quite important over longer time periods.  For example, we have 
estimated that, between 1970 and 1990, the intersectoral component of productivity 
growth explains approximately 50 percent of aggregate productivity convergence 
among EU countries (Doyle and O’Leary, 1999). 
 
On page 175 the authors attribute these differences to “the d gree of urbanisation in 
the regions and in particular to the increasingly evident preference of multinational 
companies to locate in such centres”.  Although the authors do present evidence in 
section 6 of the absolute increase in urbanisation in the 1990s, there are no 
comparisons made with earlier periods.  Has the pace of urbanisation changed, and if 
so what is the connection between the degree of urbanisation, as measured by the 
authors, and the extent of convergence/divergence?.   
 
Moreover, I am not sure that productivity differences across regions in the 1990s are 
solely or even largely attributable to multi-nationals availing of agglomeration 
economies.  It has been shown elsewhere that the presence of transfer pricing by 
multi-nationals, which accounts for part, but not all, of profit outflows, requires 
adjustment of Irish productivity levels (O’Leary, 1997; Birnie and Hitchens, 1998).  
In particular, productivity levels in regions with a concentration of multi-nationals 
will, compared to other regions, be distorted due to transfer pricing.  Leaving these 
adjustments aside, it is still likely that productivity levels for regions with a pre-
ponderance of multi-nationals will be relatively high, as they are internationally 
competitive.  The direction of causation between these efficiencies and urbanisation 
are unclear, as the authors themselves later recognize.  Multi-nationals may locate in 
an area due to IDA inducements and the availability of a skilled labour pool.  
However, it is equally plausible to argue that skilled labour is drawn to an area due 
the presence or prospective presence of multi-nationa s. 
 
Finally, in their correlation tests for their agglomeration models presented in Table 
10, the authors do not adequately explain why, in the correlation of industry 
productivity against employment levels in 1995, they get a positive sign for regional  
authority data but a negative sign for Ce sus of Industrial Production ou ty data.  
Does this mean that from equation (9), d >a for regional authorities but d < a for 
counties?  If so, what is the rationale for this surprising result?. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Overall, analysis of the growth performance of different Irish regions is an important 
and relatively new area of inquiry.  Achieving a better understanding of why  regions 
have grown at different rates over the past twenty or thirty years is necessary in order 
to inform the emerging regional policy debate.  In suggesting, urbanisation, and in 
particular agglomeration economies as possible causes for the different growth 
experiences of regions, the authors have made a worthwhile contribution to the 
debate.  However, due to the measurement difficulties already outlined, their paper 
has not adequately tested this hypothesis.   
 
My remarks have benefited from useful comments by Connell Fanning and Ber 
Power, whom I wish to acknowledge.  Finally I would like to commend this 
interesting paper to you and second the vote of thanks to Gerry, Tom and Jim.   
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Mr. Michael McGinley: There is an interesting historical setting for the data 
presented which the authors might like to address, valuable sources for this include 
Wakefield (1814), the Royal Commission on Labour (1894), Bowley (1900) and the 
work of Micheál Ross in the 1960s.  The earlier researchers were particularly 
interested in the shrinking differentials between labourers and artisans.  The marked 
change in the composition of the Irish labour force in the last twenty years, with over 
a quarter of a million mainly low paid married women accounting for almost the 
entire growth of those in work, is also very relevant to this discussion.  Explanations 
of different growth experiences such as Weber’s religion-valu s explanation could 
be explored in the different regions of Ireland.  The significance of random events, 
particularly in location decisions, must not be overlooked either.  It was not entirely 
clear if the authors identifiaction of urbanisation and high productivity was an 
explanation of the Irish growth experience or merely a description of it. 
 
REPLY TO DISCUSSION 
 
We would like to thank all those who contributed to a lively discussion and 
especially those that took the trouble to provide written comments.  We will 
comment on the points raised by each of the contributors in turn.  
 
Professor Drudy is to be complimented in the first instance for the graciousness 
with which he has accepted two carpet baggers into his area of specialisation.  His 
remarks clearly bare the mark of long-term research and we are grateful for his 
insights and wisdom on the topic.  We are particularly grateful for him pointing out 
the complexity of comparing welfare measures across regions and hence the need to 
use a more comprehensive set of indicators than per capita income.  Regions don’t 
take decisions and are not impacted by decisions.  Individuals and households do. As 
Professor Drudy emphasises quite strongly poverty and inequality occur in equal 
force in all regions.  The implication for policy of this stylised fact is clear: taxation 
and transfer programmes are rightly based on the individual and there are few, if any, 
good reasons on redistributive grounds for imposing a regional tag on our current 
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system. 
 
We naturally support Professor Drudy’s request that the CSO continue to publish 
their excellent series on GVA on the now old Regional Authority basis.  The creation 
of the two new “super” regions in recent months underlines the need for regional 
policy to be based on functionally sensible definitions of regional spaces and not on 
arbitrarily drawn administrative regions.  It is the central contention of our paper that 
a regional strategy that is based on the promotion of key urban centres will satisfy 
this requirement. 
 
In the empirical part of our paper we think that there are three findings of 
importance: 
 
1. The absence of inter-regional convergence in living standards whether measured 
using GVA or HBS data. 
2. That persistence of inter-regional output/income gaps is principally explained by 
productivity differences across the regions. 
3. There is tentative empirical support for the agglomeration hypothesis. 
 
Having considered Dr O’Leary’s comments we see no reason to alter these 
conclusions.  
 
First, let us take Eóin's comments on point (1). He has reservations about the CSO 
GVA data and we presume that his table was constructed in order to get a better 
measure of living standards in each region.  This is no doubt an interesting issue but 
as we explicitly state on page 161 it is not at all the concern of our paper.  Our 
interest is in convergence over time and in this key respect Eóin's data supports our 
finding.  Of course as far as regional productivity measures are concerned Eóin's 
adjustments are inappropriate.  Profit repatriations, no matter how extensive, do not 
distort productivity estimates whereas transfer pricing does.  This is precisely why 
we look both at inter-regional productivity and employment in our tentative 
empirical investigation of the agglomeration hypothesis.   
 
Eóin also has reservations about the CSO HBS data.  We never say in our paper that 
the HBS is “superior” to the GVA data as a measure of living standards.  We simply 
point out that it is an alternative indicator that has certain advantages over the GVA 
estimates.  It has of course the obvious disadvantages of all survey-based estimates.  
But the important point to note about the HBS and GVA data is that both sources 
point to the absence of convergence in living standards over roughly similar periods.  
Moreover, the HBS data also clearly show that the spread in living standards 
adjusted for income taxes and welfare payments is much narrower than the raw GVA 
measures.  This point also coincides with Eóin's own data. 
 
Eóin also queries our comment that the HBS estimates of direct household income 
reflect underlying productivity differences.  This puzzles us.  If we had used the 
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phrase “exactly reflects” or “is equivalent to” then we might have understood his 
concern but is Eóin suggesting that wages are not remotely influenced by 
productivity?  
 
Eóin also remarks that the absence of convergence should not be surprising and he 
asserts that it takes three decades for convergence to emerge.  We never express 
“surprise” at not finding convergence.  The really interesting result, we have argued, 
is its absence, which is, confirmed both by the GVA and HBS data and, as we have 
noted, by Eóin's own re-working of the GVA data.  This result is what we refer to on 
p. 182 as an “equilibrium phenomenon”.  But leaving this, perhaps subtle, point 
aside, Eóin's opinion, that convergence takes three decades to emerge, is in 
contradiction of the facts.  The Oxford Bulletin paper by Boyle and McCarthy 
(1997), for instance, clearly shows that convergence takes place each year in OECD 
countries up to the early 1970s.  One has to be careful not to infer from the evidence 
that because the rate of convergence is slow that it does not occur. 
 
Now let us consider Eóin's remarks on point (2).  Our second important empirical 
conclusion is that the aggregate productivity differences across regions are primarily 
due to “within” sector rather than “between” sector factors.  Eóin thinks that this 
conclusion is based on the short time period analysed and puts forward as evidence 
his own findings that over a much longer period “between” sector effects actually 
dominate.  Aside from the doubtful relevance of evidence from an unrelated dataset 
and analysis there seems to be misunderstanding of what we attempted in our paper.  
Our analysis focused on the cross-sectional variation in productivity not on the 
intertemporal variation.  What our results show is that the variation in productivity at 
a point in time, we do this for 1991 and 1995, between any given region and the state 
as a whole is not due to compositional differences in employment but to sectoral 
variations in productivity.  Eóin's opinion appears to be based on an analysis which 
concerned the intertemporal variation in productivity which is a totally different 
focus and not of concern to us. 
 
Now we come to our tentative testing of the agglomeration hypothesis.  Naturally we 
accept Eóin's reiteration of our point that causality could run either way.  But we 
would be very naïve to build our policy advice solely on foot of what we admit is 
tentative empirical analysis.  The theoretical case is strong we believe as Professor 
Drudy recognises.  Now if our simple exploratory tests had not supported the theory 
we would have been concerned.  Incidentally we were careful not to base our simple 
tests on just the HBS and GVA data.  We also employed county-based CIP data and 
examined both inter-regional productivity and employment variations.  
 
Michael McGinley makes a number of perceptive observations and each of them 
could give rise to a paper in its own right.  Do random effects matters in regional 
inomce performance?  Yes absolutely.  We emphasise at several points in the paper 
that initial conditions, or in other words, history, matters.  In the current context it is 
the set of conditions that might be referred to as “historical accidents” that gave rise 
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to the pattern and location of large urban areas in Ireland. 
 
Michael also raises the point concerning the direction of causality.  We accept, and 
hopefully have made it abundantly clear in the text of our paper, that our empirical 
tests cannot determine the direction of causality.  They merely suggest an association 
between urbanisation and productivity.  But we believe that there are strong 
theoretical arguments in support of the view that agglomeration economies precede 
the location of high-productivity firms.  
 
The valid scepticism over the extent of empirical support for the agglomeration and 
hence urbanisation hypothesis provides we believe a very rich agenda for future 
empirical work.  Specifically, we think that it would be most helpful to determine if 
urban centres require to attain a particular critical mass before agglomeration 
economies can be established.  
